The Radical Crescent: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and the Lebanese Civil War, 1973–1978

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ABSTRACT

This analysis examines the efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] to formalise relations with the United States before and after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War. It details the public and private attempts by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to present the organisation as a legitimate partner for negotiations with Israel. However, the American secretary of state and national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, hindered the PLO's diplomatic initiatives during the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations. Kissinger viewed the PLO as an impediment to his efforts to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict through separate peace agreements, rather than a comprehensive solution. Despite Washington's objections to the PLO, the organisation had regional and international legitimacy, its stature aided by its political and ideological allies. Yet these ties also contributed to the PLO's involvement in the Lebanese civil war. Kissinger encouraged Syria's June 1976 invasion of Lebanon to weaken, if not destroy, the PLO as an independent actor. Although the PLO survived Syria's intervention, Kissinger's actions and agreements limited the diplomatic initiatives of the Jimmy Carter Administration.

Fifteen months after the fall of Saigon, Henry Kissinger, President Gerald Ford's secretary of state, worried that dominoes would tumble in the Middle East. Fearing that a leftist victory in the Lebanese civil war would scuttle his diplomatic strategy to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict—the war began in April 1975—Kissinger predicted that a Lebanon ruled by the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] and its allies would lead to a "radical crescent" stretching from Iraq to Libya. Whilst Kissinger co–ordinated with Syria and Israel to counter the organisation, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat sought relations with Washington. Lebanon became the site for regional and international intrigues and competing diplomatic and military strategies.

In this period, a fraught relationship existed between the United States and the PLO. Kissinger hindered the PLO's attempts to formalise diplomatic ties

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with Washington and his reluctance to recognise the organized was due to his strategy toward the Arab–Israeli peace process, which aligned with Israel's policies and preferences. By emphasising an Egyptian–Israeli settlement, Kissinger sought to break the unified Arab position and exclude the PLO from participating in the negotiations. Intended to legitimise the organisation internationally, the PLO's diplomatic initiatives complicated Kissinger's efforts. Newly declassified records show that the Lebanese civil war provided Kissinger with an opportunity to undermine the PLO; and he encouraged Syria to intervene in the conflict. However, Kissinger's influence did not end with the Ford presidency as his actions and agreements constrained the Administration of President Jimmy Carter.

Scholars have examined different aspects of the relationship between the United States and the PLO.[1] Yet, Washington's interactions with and policies towards the organisation during the first phase of the Lebanese civil war remain relatively unexplored.[2] Although significant gaps in the archival record exist, in particular a fuller understanding of PLO decision-making, there is sufficient evidence to analyse relations between the United States and the PLO during this period.

The June 1967 and October 1973 wars re-shaped the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Compounded by Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, Israel's overwhelming victory in 1967 dealt a devastating blow to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the ideology of pan-Arabism.[3] Six years later, superpower tensions and direct American involvement to resolve the conflict accompanied the 1973 War.

An independent PLO emerged after the June 1967 War—established by Nasser in 1964, the organisation was largely beholden to Cairo. However, Palestinian *fedayeen* groups committed to armed struggle challenged and eventually dominated the PLO.[4] Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee and also served as the head of Fatah, the PLO's largest faction, which espoused an ideology that combined pan-Arabism and Palestinian nationalism.[5] The Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], led by Dr. George Habash, was Fatah's main ideological and political rival within the organisation. Under Arafat's leadership, the PLO maintained ties with the different Arab states and developed relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Cuba, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. The PLO adopted a strategy that combined diplomatic initiatives and military operations based on the examples of the Vietnamese and Algerian revolutions.[6] In the context of Cold War competition with Moscow, the PLO's "radicalism" increasingly alarmed Washington.[7] In addition, America's "special relationship" with Israel expanded during Richard Nixon's presidency (1969–1974) and exacerbated Washington's hostility toward the PLO.[8]

Upon entering office in January 1969, Nixon concentrated on the Vietnam War and did not consider the Arab–Israeli conflict a priority. William Rogers, his first secretary of state, attempted to resolve the conflict based on United Nations [UN] Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the territories occupied in the June 1967 War and peace between the combatant states. What became known as the "Rogers Plan," proposed bilateral peace agreements, including the delineation of final borders and the repatriation or re-settlement of Palestinian refugees. Yet Rogers encountered resistance from Israel, the Soviet Union, and the Nixon White House. The PLO rejected UNSCR 242 and the Rogers Plan because neither recognised Palestinian national rights.[9]

However, Egypt and Israel eventually accepted the Plan. Nixon's promise of additional military aid and an assurance that Washington would not require adherence to the "Arab definition" of UNSCR 242 secured Israel's acceptance. In the Middle East, Israel was essential to the Nixon Doctrine, which bolstered America's allies through increased arms sales. Focused on Vietnam and the 1972 presidential election, Nixon and Kissinger, then the national security advisor, preferred to re-enforce Israel's military superiority rather than achieve a negotiated settlement. Without support from the White House, the Americans abandoned the Rogers Plan and stalemate persisted.[10]

Meanwhile, the Nixon Administration attempted to contain the PLO. Jordan served as the organisation's main base of political and military operations. The PLO's actions and growing stature embarrassed and threatened King Hussein. In early September 1970, the PFLP successfully hijacked four commercial airliners, three of which landed at Jordan's Dawson Field, with the passengers and crew forced to disembark and the planes destroyed. King Hussein used the hijackings as a final pretext to move against the PLO. The subsequent Jordanian civil war, also known as "Black September," was short but bloody. The United States and Israel supported Jordan's harsh crackdown and the PLO was defeated. After Nasser mediated an end to the fighting, the organisation shifted its base of operations to Lebanon.[11]

Arafat attempted to establish relations with the United States after the Jordanian civil war. One channel was Robert Ames of the American Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. Ames developed a relationship with Ali Hassan Salameh—also known as Abu Hassan—the head of Arafat's bodyguard unit, Force 17. Beginning in late 1969, Salameh communicated with Ames on a routine basis with Arafat's knowledge. However, the CIA was determined to recruit Salameh. Although Ames objected, his superiors overruled him. After the recruitment failed, Salameh cut off contact with Ames.[12]

The June 1973 superpower summit appeared to provide a new opportunity for relations between America and the PLO. In their joint summit communiqué, Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev declared the interest of the superpowers in achieving a peaceful settlement to the

Arab–Israeli conflict and acknowledged that a negotiated agreement "should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people."[13] Arafat asked Salameh to re-establish contact with Ames and discuss the communiqué. One complicating factor was the March 1973 attack on the Saudi Embassy in Sudan by the Black September Organisation [BSO].[14]

High-ranking Fatah officials including Salah Khalaf [Abu Iyad], Salameh, and Mohammed Oudeh led the BSO, an offshoot of Fatah created after the Jordanian civil war. The BSO was responsible for the November 1971 assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal and the September 1972 attack on the Olympic Games held in Munich, West Germany.[15] In early March 1973, a BSO cell raided a party at the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum, with several diplomats taken hostage and three assassinated, including Cleo Noel, the American ambassador to Sudan, and George Curtis Moore, the American *chargé d'affaires*.[16] Whilst unclear who authorised the assassination of the diplomats, the State Department blamed Arafat.[17]

Salameh informed Ames that Arafat had "put a lid on" further attacks on Americans. "The lid would stay on," Ames reported to Washington, "as long as both sides could maintain a dialogue, even though they might have basic disagreements." He clarified that this was "not a threat" by the PLO, but "a recognition that talking was necessary."[18] "A basic change in Fatah ideology has finally been accepted by the Fatah leadership," Salameh explained to Ames, and Fatah had come to accept that "Israel is here to stay." "But the Palestinians must have a home and that home will be Jordan," Salameh added. Arafat claimed to have the support of the Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to establish a "Palestinian Republic" in Jordan that would replace the Hashemite Kingdom. Jordan would be the "prime target of the fedayeen, with acts of terrorism against Israel maintained to sustain the movement's credibility." According to Salameh, the PLO "was more unified than ever with Arafat and Fatah in undisputed control."

Ames relayed several questions from Arafat to the Nixon Administration. The PLO chairman asked, "What does the [U.S. Government] mean when it says 'Palestinian interests'?." Arafat also enquired what considerations, if any, Washington had envisioned for the Palestinians in an interim or partial solution. Finally, he asked, "How can any solution be meaningful while Jordan exists?"[19]

Although Arafat claimed to have the support of the Fatah leadership, it is uncertain if the rest of the PLO's Executive Committee approved his message to the United States.[20] The organisation was committed to the Palestine National Charter that called for a secular, democratic state in all of historic Palestine achieved through armed struggle. After the Jordanian civil war, although still advocating the overthrow of King Hussein, the PLO began to moderate its public stance toward the Jordanian regime. In addition,

following the Munich attack, there was an internal debate within Fatah over the use of terrorism.[21] Nevertheless, Kissinger decided to ignore Arafat. A "nothing message" was relayed to Ames for the PLO.[22]

On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched simultaneous attacks against Israeli positions in the occupied Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula. The war culminated a year of planning between Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. Sadat and Assad hoped to challenge the six-year *status quo* and force the United States and Israel to engage seriously in peace talks.[23] When the October War broke out, the Watergate scandal distracted the Nixon White House. Now serving as both secretary of state and national security advisor, Kissinger was responsible for leading Washington's response. He sought Moscow's co-operation at the UN Security Council whilst attempting to limit Soviet involvement in a settlement. The goal, Kissinger later wrote, was for the United States to "emerge as mediator and demonstrate that the road to peace led through Washington." Kissinger shuttled between different capitals to achieve a cease-fire, albeit one that favoured Israel.[24]

Co-ordination with Israel accompanied public diplomacy. In a conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Kissinger supported Israel's continuing counter-offensive against Egyptian forces. Israeli forces pressed on in spite of UNSCR 338, which called for a cease-fire, and affirmed UNSCR 242. The result was increased tensions between Washington and Moscow, including a nuclear alert. In addition, some of the Arab member states of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries imposed a six-month oil embargo on the United States due to its overt support for Israel. Fear of the political and economic consequences of another oil embargo during an American presidential election year factored into Kissinger's calculations during the Lebanese civil war.[25]

In November 1973, Kissinger decided to initiate contact with the PLO, asking General Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, to meet with senior Fatah officials, Khalid and Hani al-Hassan. Kissinger tasked Walters with informing the PLO of Washington's position and gaining an understanding of "Palestinian thinking." Meeting the al-Hassan brothers in Morocco and explaining that the United States was not prepared to abandon King Hussein, Walters also emphasised Washington's support for Israel and warned against further attacks on American diplomats. The United States and Fatah came to a tacit arrangement: Fatah would not attack American targets and a channel to Washington would remain open. Kissinger later wrote that his goal in authorising the meeting was to prevent "radical attacks" on the peace process.[26]

A month later, the superpowers convened a conference in Geneva under UN auspices. Egypt and Israel attended the conference, but Syria did not and the PLO was not invited. The conference did not yield any meaningful

progress and Kissinger focused on the Egyptian–Israeli track, achieving an initial disengagement agreement for the Sinai Peninsula in January. In May 1974, Kissinger brokered a separate agreement between Syria and Israel for the Golan Heights. Although Nixon resigned from office three months later, Kissinger maintained his authority over foreign policy in the new Ford administration.[27]

Arafat, however, sought more than an informal arrangement with Washington. His chief concerns were PLO participation in future negotiations if the Geneva talks resumed and preventing Jordan from re-establishing its rule over the West Bank through a settlement with Israel. Arafat asked several Arab leaders and prominent Palestinians to meet with American officials and discuss the PLO's willingness to compromise. Within the State Department, advocates of developing relations with the PLO argued that Fatah represented the PLO's "moderate" wing, and its leadership possessed "more reasonable" attitudes toward a settlement with Israel. In spite of their revolutionary rhetoric, the American Embassy in Beirut explained that Fatah's leadership would agree to a political settlement that validated their movement and ensured their "future personal advantage."[28]

In June 1974, the PLO made the most explicit announcement of its changing position. The Palestinian National Council [PNC], the PLO's "parliament-in-exile," adopted a new ten-point programme that authorised the creation of a "national authority" on "every part of Palestinian land to be liberated." To appease the PFLP-led "rejectionist" bloc, the programme opposed the establishment of "a Palestinian entity" that recognised Israel or abandoned the right of return of Palestinian refugees. In addition, the programme reiterated the PLO's commitment to armed struggle and opposition to UNSCR 242.[29] Although it was a compromise programme, the PFLP and Fatah were quickly at odds over its implementation. In spite of the rejectionist language, Arafat hoped that his interpretation of the programme would pave the way to better relations with Washington and eventual negotiations with Israel. Advocates of relations with the PLO re-enforced this point to Kissinger with little success.[30]

Egypt supported the PLO's new programme. In a June 10 meeting with the PLO's Executive Committee, Sadat explained that the "Palestinians must be flexible and identify what is 'feasible'." He added that Cairo was co-ordinating with Damascus and Amman and reassured the Executive Committee members that "we are committed to you."[31] Moscow also attempted to influence the PLO. Prior to the October 1973 War, Ames reported that the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, Sarvar Azimov, encouraged Arafat to establish a government-in-exile and form a "Palestinian entity." However, Arafat feared that taking these steps would allow the Arab states to ignore the Palestinian issue. "Arafat wants a real state or nothing," Ames wrote.[32]

Rather than encouraging the "moderate" wing led by Fatah, Kissinger attempted to undercut the PLO's influence. Prior to the October 1974 Arab League meeting in Rabat, Morocco, Kissinger tried to broker an interim agreement between Jordan and Israel. Kissinger's failure to reach a settlement bolstered the PLO. At the Rabat summit, the Arab League recognised the PLO as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,"[33] a blow to King Hussein's hopes of regaining the West Bank. Sadat also brokered a public reconciliation between Hussein and Arafat, but it proved only temporary, and Amman served as an intermediary between Damascus and Washington during the Lebanese civil war.[34] Israel responded angrily to the Rabat Summit. The new Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, declared, "There are no negotiations with the terrorist organisations. We have nothing to say to them." He added that if the Arab League decided that Jordan was not the representative to negotiate with Israel, "then there is no-one to talk with about peace on our eastern border."[35]

A few weeks later, Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly. The appearance was largely due to the efforts of Algeria, which held the General Assembly's presidency. Behind the scenes, the visit was co-ordinated with the American Embassy in Lebanon and a reluctant White House. Arafat received the same status as a head of state, which angered the United States and Israel.[36] Wearing his trademark *kaffiyeh* and an empty gun holster, Arafat placed the Palestinian cause within the context of anti-colonial national liberation struggles around the globe and made a direct appeal to the American people. Arafat did not explicitly refer to or accept UNSCR 242 or 338. Instead, he spoke of "the Palestine of tomorrow" where Muslims, Jews, and Christians would be equal.[37]

Kissinger dismissed the Arab League's decision and Arafat's speech, explaining at a 15 November 1974 press conference that the United States would not advise Israel to deal with the PLO. "This is entirely a decision for Israel and any of the other parties that may be involved," he stated.[38] Kissinger added that he did not detect a change in the PLO's stance toward Israel: "Our reading of [Arafat's speech] is that it called for a state which really did not include the existence of Israel, and therefore was dealing with a successor state, and we do not consider this a particularly moderate position."

The UN received a similar message when the United States finally answered the questions Arafat relayed through Salameh and Ames 15 months earlier. John Scali, the United States permanent representative to the UN, stated, "the way to move toward a situation that is more responsive to Palestinian interests is not through glittering resolutions or through dramatic parliamentary maneuvers but by weaving Palestinian interests into the give-and-take of the negotiating process. By this evolutionary process Palestinian interests can be reflected in the new situations that are created."[39]

In spite of Washington's objections, the UN joined the Arab League in recognising the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and awarded the organisation observer status. The combination of UN and Arab League recognition increased the PLO's international profile and legitimacy as a participant in peace talks. In January 1975, George McMurtrie Godley, the American ambassador to Lebanon, urged Washington to establish a dialogue with the PLO to bolster its moderates and satisfy Arab leaders. Others in Washington supported Godley's assessment, including the CIA's Ames and National Security Council [NSC] staffer William Quandt.[40] Over the next six months, Arafat met separately with United States Senators George McGovern, Democrat, and Howard Baker, a Republican, in Beirut. Arafat indicated to McGovern and Baker that the PLO was willing to recognise Israel and create a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although Kissinger was aware of Arafat's willingness to make concessions, he ignored the overture and, instead, attempted to weaken, if not eliminate, the PLO by proxy.[41]

The Lebanese civil war interrupted the PLO's diplomatic offensive. Under the terms of the 1969 Cairo Agreement, the PLO acquired authority over the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.[42] Over the next six years, the organisation established a para-state in Lebanon, where its increased military presence and activities engendered support and opposition within the country. The leftist Lebanese National Movement [LNM], led by Kamal Jumblatt, found ideological and political support from Fatah and the PFLP, including Arafat, Khalaf, and Habash. Pierre Jumayyil's Phalange Party—*Hizb al-Kat ā'ib*—and the National Liberal Party [NLP], led by former Lebanese President Camille Sham'un, opposed the PLO's presence. The Phalange and NLP portrayed the PLO-LNM alliance as part of an international communist conspiracy that threatened Lebanon.[43]

Khalaf later described the PLO's tenuous position. He explained to the leaders of the Phalange and the NLP that after being expelled from Jordan, the PLO "had no other place to go but Lebanon" and "wouldn't have any choice but to fight to the finish."[44] According to Khalaf, the Phalange's militia trained openly, whilst the NLP's Tigers—*Numur*—prepared in secret. "At the time," he wrote, "we were naive enough to believe the Christian parties when they said they had no intention of starting an armed conflict. Otherwise, we never would have waited for the outbreak of the civil war before arming and training the militias of the leftist groups."

Months of tension between the political factions finally erupted into civil war on 13 April 1975. After several Phalange supporters were wounded in a drive-by shooting at a church in the east Beirut neighbourhood of 'Ayn al-Rummaneh, the militia retaliated by attacking a bus returning to the Tal al-Za'atar refugee camp and killed 21 Palestinians. Lebanon split along political, ideological, socio-economic as well as sectarian lines. Over the next eight months, multiple cease-fires failed. The PLO's alliance with the LNM not

only dragged it into the civil war, but it provided an opportunity for the United States, Syria, Israel, and the right-wing Lebanese militias to unite against the organisation.[45]

The commencement of fighting in Lebanon came as Kissinger focused on negotiating the second Sinai disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. Concluded in September, the Sinai II negotiations had implications for the PLO. Israel and the United States signed a secret memorandum of understanding [MOU] that prevented Washington from negotiating or for-malising relations with the PLO until it recognised Israel and accepted UNSCR 242. The United States also agreed that it would "seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interest of Israel." The MOU framed and constrained Washington's relations with the PLO for over a decade.[46]

Sadat and his foreign minister, Ismail Fahmy, did not know about the MOU before its signature. According to Hermann Eilts, the American ambassador to Egypt, Sadat and Fahmy were "furious" after they learnt about the agreement.[47] Kissinger attempted to assuage their concerns by claiming that Washington had flexibility under the MOU to talk to the PLO after consulting Israel. Eilts described Kissinger's explanation as "slightly disingenuous," adding, "the Egyptian leadership was not persuaded." Sidelined by Kissinger and Sadat, Assad criticised the Sinai II agreement and began promoting the PLO as a partner to future negotiations.[48]

With Sinai II complete, Kissinger turned his attention to Lebanon. On 10 October 1975, during a brief lull in the fighting, he convened a Washington special actions group [WSAG] comprised of senior officials from the State and Defense departments, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NSC. After a briefing on the crisis, Kissinger explained to the group, "I want to define our own interests. I have no particular interest in Lebanon's internal affairs if they do not involve outside countries. I don't want us involved in their internal affairs. Our concern is to prevent outside interference."[49] Joseph Sisco, undersecretary of state for Political Affairs, was concerned about the regional implications of the Lebanese conflict. He warned, "the Lebanese situation could turn to a leftist-radical orientation. This would invite outside intervention and all the work we have done with Egypt, Syria and Jordan could be upset." Sisco explained that the Phalange had "undue expectations of direct U.S. involvement" and mistakenly believed that the American military would intervene in Lebanon as it did in 1958. "American Marines will not land in Lebanon," he added firmly.[50] The WSAG reconvened three days later to discuss the possibility of interventions by Syria and Israel. Although the WSAG members agreed an Israeli invasion would be "disastrous," they were not in favour of a Syrian intervention either. Yet Kissinger's attitude changed over the next few months as the PLO-LNM alliance neared victory.[51]

January 1976 marked a turning point in the first stage of the Lebanese civil war. In east Beirut, the Phalange and *Numur* militias encircled the Palestinian refugee camp of Tal al-Za'atar and captured the al-Dhubayeh camp. Also razed were the coastal neighbourhoods of Karantina and Maslakh, home to a large number of LNM supporters. In retaliation, the joint PLO-LNM forces invaded the villages of Damur, Sa'diyat, and Jiyeh, south of Beirut. The different militias committed atrocities and set the stage for further reprisals and bloodshed.[52]

The capture of Damur and the neighbouring villages accompanied by a split in the Lebanese army influenced Assad's decision to intervene. On 23 January 1976, following a cease-fire mediated by Damascus, elements of the Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army and al-Sa'iqa, a PLO faction supported by Syria, were despatched to Lebanon. Al-Sa'iqa's forces increased over the next few months; and its public statements reflected Syria's position of preventing the "partition" of Lebanon and criticised the PLO's leadership.[53]

In the midst of the fighting, Arafat attempted a new diplomatic initiative through UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. He proposed an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the establishment of a temporary UN trusteeship administered by a joint UN–Arab League peace-keeping force. After six months, the PLO would replace the UN–Arab League forces.[54] Arafat also discussed the proposal with United States Senator Adlai Stevenson III, a Democrat, and suggested that he would be willing to recognise Israel in return for even a limited withdrawal. [55] However, the escalating Lebanese civil war and the American electoral calendar overshadowed Arafat's proposal.

On 15 March 1976, Kissinger convened a meeting of his key deputies to discuss the situation in Lebanon. Richard Murphy, the American ambassador to Syria, reported that top Syrian officials were considering a full-scale invasion. Kissinger instructed Murphy to meet with Assad.[56] "Ask him what he is up to and, if we agree with him, we will do our best to help him. But warn him what he does must be done without the use of Syrian regular forces. In that event, we will guarantee that the Israelis do not interfere," Kissinger explained. "Have him tell us what he thinks will be the outcome of what he is doing, and what he wants as the outcome," Kissinger added. "Tell him I am optimistic we will be able to guarantee that there will be no Israeli action as long as outside forces are not introduced into Lebanon." In his memoir, *Years of Renewal*, Kissinger wrote that the discussions with Damascus demonstrated that Washington "emerged as the indispensable balance wheel of diplomacy in Lebanon because all the players had a stake in good relations with us."[57]

Kissinger reconvened the WSAG on 24 March 1976.[58] "I never thought I would read in a cable that the Syrians want to reduce Communist influence

in Lebanon," he remarked. The PLO–LNM alliance was now receiving support from Egypt, which Kissinger believed was Sadat's attempt to re-establish credibility after the Sinai II agreement. It was still unclear if Assad intended to invade Lebanon or Israel's response. If Syria intervened, Kissinger explained, "They may never leave. It might be alright though if they were to go in and put out the PLO and then could be replaced by a UN force." Although that was Kissinger's preferred outcome—and he had support from Jordan's King Hussein—he did not believe it was likely. Instead, Kissinger feared that an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon to attack and destroy the PLO's bases in "Fatahland" would lead to a regional war.

Later that day, Kissinger met with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz. Kissinger had previously proposed "full cooperation and coordination" between the United States and Israel on the Lebanese crisis. Reading from a prepared memorandum, Dinitz agreed with Kissinger's suggestion and detailed Israel's objections to an "open and declared" Syrian intervention. Although Kissinger explained that Jordan and Saudi Arabia favoured action by Syria, whilst Egypt remained firmly opposed, Dinitz was not prepared to provide additional guidance. He did agree to inform Washington before Israel pursued military action. To avoid a conflict between Syria and Israel, Kissinger said he would caution Damascus against intervening in Lebanon.[59]

On 26 March 1976, Kissinger met with his deputies and Murphy. He complained about Israel's stance.[60] "The thing that's so strange is that [Assad's] interests and Israel's are parallel," he said. "This is just another one of those horrors that Israel has inflicted on the rest of us. If they had only let him move ... and clean out the PLO in the process."[61] The next day, Kissinger called Dinitz to ask the Israelis to reconsider their position on a Syrian invasion. "If the PLO prevails in Lebanon and if Asad gets overthrown by radicals, they will stay," Kissinger explained, "Then the end result may still be that Lebanon will become part of the Syrian system except for a different route. I think this should be considered by your people." "You might then have a more radical Lebanon and a radicalized Syria," he added. Dinitz replied, "our people do not see any good [that] can come out of Syrian intervention," but agreed to relay Kissinger's request for a reassessment.

Israel's position changed over the next two months. Rabin eventually embraced Assad's decision to invade and Israel armed the Lebanese Christian militias with Washington's approval.[62] In mid-April, Israel publicly declared that Lebanon's Litani River was a "red line" for Syrian forces. With the warning perceived as a signal to Syria, Assad could not immediately take advantage of the opportunity without appearing to be openly collaborating with Israel. On 19 April 1976, Murphy reported that Assad rejected Israel's ultimatum "categorically." Assad declared, "What is happening in Lebanon is an Arab problem and the Arabs are the only ones qualified to deal with this

problem."[63] He also continued negotiating with the PLO and the LNM to end the conflict.[64]

Meanwhile, Kissinger selected retired State Department veteran Dean Brown to mediate between the different factions—he served as the American ambassador to Jordan during the Jordanian civil war. Brown warned the LNM's Jumblatt that failure to accept Assad's proposal to end the Lebanese conflict would result in Syrian intervention.[65] Arafat appeared initially to support Brown's mediation efforts.[66] In response, Kissinger sent a secret message through the Ames channel to the PLO chairman recognising his "constructive role" in Lebanon. Kissinger indicated that under conditions "where the right to existence of each state in the area is recognized, I believe possibilities for a more formal dialogue could develop without prejudice to any other issue."[67] However, Syrian and American co-ordination ensured that those conditions proved hollow. As part of Assad's proposal to end the conflict, Syria endorsed Iliyas Sarkis as Lebanon's new president. Sarkis also had the support of the Phalange and NLP, but the PLO and the LNM were opposed to his candidacy. Backed by Washington and Damascus, Sarkis became president and the fighting persisted.[68]

In early June, the Syrian army entered Lebanon: Damascus claimed the intervention was to assist Christian Maronite villages under attack.[69] Neither the United States nor Israel raised strong objections to Syria's invasion. On 11 June 1976, Kissinger instructed Murphy to inform Assad that Washington "had helped forestall the consequences that would lead to broader conflict."[70] However, Syria's intervention did not go as far as either Kissinger or Assad hoped. The joint PLO–LNM forces fought the Syrian army, al-Saʿiqa, and the Lebanese Christian militias. Over the next month, al-Saʿiqa was routed and the Syrian army suffered embarrassing defeats at Sawfar and Sidon.[71]

Following Syria's intervention, Francis Meloy was despatched to Lebanon as the new American ambassador. However, a small Lebanese faction with ties to the PFLP assassinated Meloy without the knowledge or approval of Arafat or Habash. After Meloy's death, the Ford Administration decided to evacuate the American Embassy in Beirut. [72]

Ford approved security co-ordination with the PLO in Lebanon prior to Syria's invasion. Salameh and a select group from Fatah protected the American Embassy and diplomats and then assisted with their evacuation. The co-ordination did not violate the terms of the MOU with Israel, and Kissinger kept Israeli officials informed of interactions with the PLO.[73] Ford publicly thanked the PLO in a press conference whilst Kissinger sent the organisation's leadership a letter expressing "his appreciation of the great and constructive role undertaken by the Palestinians." The PLO responded publicly to the letter:

> In spite of our basic and principle differences with the U.S. Government, which takes a stand hostile to Palestinian and Arab national aspirations, the leadership of the Palestinian revolution is well aware of its international and local responsibilities and is very much concerned to deal with all on the bases of justice and the legitimate objectives for which the Palestinian revolution was launched.[74]

Washington's stance toward the organisation did not change, however.

At an 18 June 1976 Cabinet meeting, Kissinger explained that a stalemate in Lebanon was the most likely outcome.[75] "The end result should be a strategic situation which is favorable to us, because Syria and Egypt probably will get back together," he said. "We must remember that we are the only ones who are really in touch with all the parties and the only useful force working with all of them." It came with a warning: "A spectacular Syrian defeat probably would overthrow Assad. With this probable moderate outcome, we are in a good position for peace. If we can keep all the radicals from uniting, or all the Arabs, it looks like a positive aspect to the tragedy of Lebanon."

Syria's poor military performance threatened Kissinger's plans. Meeting with regional ambassadors on 22 June 1976, Kissinger detailed the implications of the Lebanese conflict; and in spite of his instructions to Murphy eleven days earlier, he denied that Washington had given Syria a "green light."[76] He also rejected Egypt's suggestion to reconvene the Geneva conference and invite the PLO. Eilts argued that engaging with the PLO would assist Sadat's weakened position after Sinai II, help resolve the Lebanese crisis, and contribute to a comprehensive peace settlement. Kissinger insisted that no new initiatives would occur until after the American presidential election in November. Chastened by the Sinai II experience and the tensions with Israel over the negotiations, he explained, "my reasons are solely domestic." Believing an open relationship with the PLO would anger Israel and upset American Jewish voters in an election year, Kissinger argued that a policy change toward the PLO would only benefit the Democratic Party nominee, Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter. Kissinger angrily dismissed Sadat's fears that Washington was colluding with Syria and Israel: "The fact is, as [Murphy] knows, we didn't know a goddamn thing about what Asad was doing. The fact is, as [assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Roy [Atherton] knows, we never knew a goddamn thing about what Israel was doing." "But all of us know all that you know," he told the group. "This isn't a case where there is something going on in Washington that you don't know about. While we can continue to take credit with the Arabs for restraining the Israelis, the sad fact is we didn't."[77]

Despite his earlier denial, Kissinger conceded that Washington had restrained Israel. "We told them we wouldn't accept partition [of Lebanon]. I told them in April—maybe I scared the bejeesus out of them—that we

wouldn't stand for another Middle East war, and if there were a war, we wouldn't go through this disengagement again."[78]

Murphy did not challenge or correct Kissinger's account. Instead, he explained that one of Syria's goals was to "reeducate" Fatah. However, Assad "was surprised by the strength of Arafat's support in the Arab world."[79] Kissinger attempted to explain his interactions with Damascus. When Assad proposed intervening in March, he said, "I was at first extremely attracted, on the basis that the PLO was, at best, a nuisance to us, and at worst, created enormous problems in our country, and for the peace process." Kissinger feared that the PLO would "radicalize" the positions of the Arab states and prevent progress on the Egyptian and Syrian negotiating tracks. He added that a "Palestinian entity" would eventually emerge, likely confederated with Jordan, "So I wouldn't have wept any great tears if the PLO had been weakened at the end of March." However, he claimed that a Syrian intervention at the time would have forced Israel to invade southern Lebanon, instigating another regional war. Although Washington prevented a wider conflict, Syria's intervention was failing. "I started with the assumption the Syrians would succeed," Kissinger explained. "I forgot the infinite capacity of the Arabs to screw things up. I thought they'd weaken the PLO, make it an appendage of Syria, bring in Jordan, and create a Greater Syria. I still think this is what [Assad] has in mind."[80]

Eilts was still concerned about Sadat's impression that Washington was co-ordinating with Syria to destroy the PLO. "Look, Sadat has told me his only use for Arafat is if someone raises the Palestinian issue, he can say 'Go see Arafat'," Kissinger argued, "And [Sadat] is using Arafat now to end his own isolation. He's enjoying himself now." Kissinger added that once negotiations renewed after the presidential election, Sadat would not countenance any complaints by the PLO. "Sadat will close all the PLO offices and kick them out. They'll all screw the PLO if they get their piece," Kissinger declared. "I want to avoid the impression in Egypt that we're colluding with the Syrians, and I want to give the Syrians a sense that we're sympathetic. We want to help weaken the PLO without losing the PLO," he explained. "We can't create the presumption that the PLO is the key to everything. It's everybody's cop-out. It has to be the end of the process."[81]

As the fighting intensified in July, meeting with Hanan Bar-On, an Israeli embassy official, Kissinger explained that tensions were emerging between Moscow and Damascus.[82] "What we'd like is Rabin's assessment of the situation and what we should do," Kissinger said. He added, "We are of the tentative view that it's in our interest to keep the Syrians in Lebanon." However, Washington had yet to inform Damascus of the decision. "If the Syrians withdraw, Asad will fall," Kissinger explained. "There would be a radical crescent stretching from Iraq, to Syria, to Lebanon—and it would be a Soviet victory." Kissinger reiterated these fears as Assad's position weakened.

By August, Kissinger faced a failing Syrian intervention and a PLO wea-kened but not defeated. He met in Tehran with Eilts and Thomas Pickering, the American ambassador to Jordan.[83] Kissinger was blunt, "I want to make it clear that a Syrian defeat in Lebanon would be a disaster." "I know Egypt does not agree," he added, "but to leave Asad sandwiched between two radical states if the PLO wins in Lebanon and Syria loses would probably mean the overthrow of Asad." "This would be of no benefit to Sadat. I do not know what he thinks he can get out of his policy in Lebanon," he said. Eilts countered, "Sadat has no policy in Lebanon." He explained that Sadat had "a policy toward Syria" and wanted to prevent a Syrian victory since it would "give them greater weight as leaders of the Arab world and give them control of the PLO." However, Eilts reported that Sadat was amenable to a Syrian overture.[84]

Kissinger was not encouraged.[85] "I am not that keen on Egypt and Syria getting together but I do not want Syria to lose in Lebanon," he said. "Also, I would prefer to have the PLO under Syrian control than free-wheeling since we must deal with Syria anyway and the PLO would be under some control." "If Lebanon is dominated by the PLO it will give us fits and that includes Sadat," Kissinger explained. He feared that a strong PLO would impede a comprehensive solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Once controlled, the PLO would be included at the end of the negotiating process. Eilts concurred with Kissinger's assessment and added that Sadat also shared their concerns.

Kissinger did not favour Syrian domination either.[86] "Had we given Syria the green light in March they would have defeated first the PLO and then the Christians and would have ended up in total control of Lebanon which would gradually have become radicalised. That would have given Syria too much control," he explained. Instead, Washington "encouraged or acquiesced in the strengthening of the Christians. They are now strong enough to resist possible Syrian domination. It would require too much Syrian force and Syria is no longer that strong." Kissinger added, "there is no longer a threat of Syrian domination but the danger now is of a Syrian collapse."

The combination of Assad's weakened regime and the American electoral calendar undermined Sadat's efforts to broker relations between the PLO and Washington. Sadat wanted the Ford Administration to recognise the PLO as a reward for signing the Sinai II agreement. However, Kissinger insisted that talking with the PLO was not an option, as Washington could not deliver the organisation's "minimum demands." Kissinger disingenuously claimed that the PLO was a "Soviet Trojan horse." Involving the organisation in the peace process would "give the Soviets leverage over the negotiations if they got into them prematurely," he explained. "We can bring them in at the end of the process after the others have been satisfied and the PLO has been weakened."

Although Washington would eventually deal with the PLO, Kissinger added, the organisation would be kept "two steps behind" the Arab states.[87]

In the interim, there was Assad's precarious situation at home and in Lebanon. "The Syrians should have gone all the way once they started," Kissinger said.[88] He conceded, "Israel would not have gone in in June but it is true we did not give the Syrians a new signal. However, the Israelis never gave us a changed signal so we were not bluffing the Syrians. They should have seen the situation themselves." After being reminded that the PLO was tougher than Assad had anticipated, Kissinger declared, "Take it from me as a veteran of Vietnam, there are no awards for losing moderately." The Syrians "should have thrown in two divisions in June and gone balls out to win. But now it is too late and I am worried about the collapse of Asad," Kissinger lamented.

Kissinger reiterated Washington's stance for Eilts and Pickering to relay to Cairo and Amman.[89] "We do not want Syria to lose in Lebanon and we want the PLO weakened," he said. "Our strategy is to bring the PLO into negotiations at the end, keeping them a step behind Egypt, Syria and Jordan so that they will be manageable." "Otherwise," he warned, "the PLO will disrupt the negotiations by demanding more than the Arab Governments want or can meet." "We have no illusion about Asad but we want to keep Syria split from Libya and Iraq and the USSR. If a radical crescent involving Iraq, Syria, a PLO controlled Lebanon and Libya comes into being—following the overthrow of Asad—it will be very bad for Egypt."

As Kissinger was meeting in Tehran, the PLO was negotiating with Syria and the Lebanese Christian militias for an end to the siege of the Palestinian refugee camps of Jisr al-Basha and Tal al-Zaʿatar. In spite of the agreement to surrender the camps, and in a harbinger of the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres, the Phalange and *Numur* militias committed numerous atrocities against the remaining inhabitants.[90] Meanwhile, Syria and Israel interdicted ships bound for Lebanon, seizing weapons and PLO officials. Arms bound for the Lebanese Christian militias did not face a similar blockade.[91] In October 1976, the Arab League led by Saudi Arabia brokered a cease-fire. It authorised the creation of the Arab Deterrent Force to maintain the agreement. However, Assad used this Force to extend his control over Lebanon.[92]

Two months later, Kissinger hosted Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres and Dinitz at the State Department.[93] The meeting followed Carter's victory in the presidential election, and Peres hoped to secure additional weapons shipments before the Ford Administration left office. Kissinger and Peres praised Assad's actions in Lebanon. "It took a real statesman to see that Syria should and could turn against the PLO," Kissinger said. The Lebanese Christian militias were in a stronger position and, he explained, "the six months we gained with the Dean Brown mission changed the strategic situation." "Asad's situation is

much much better for us than in 1975. He totally distrusts the Soviets now; he understands the situation. He's stuck in Lebanon," Kissinger observed. He added that Assad was considering a negotiated settlement with Israel. As the conversation shifted to Kissinger's plans after leaving the State Department, the three men discussed Israel's military progress since the October 1973 War. "We appreciate what you have done," Peres told Kissinger after presenting him with a gift. "I value my friendship with the leaders of Israel and you can count on my friendship," Kissinger replied.[94]

Kissinger's influence on the Arab–Israeli peace process outlasted his tenure as secretary of state. After surviving the initial phase of the Lebanese civil war, the PLO's leadership hoped to establish relations with the new Administration. The 1975 MOU with Israel limited Carter's attempts to achieve a comprehensive solution and re-start the Geneva conference. Carter reaffirmed Washington's commitment to the MOU, but he was willing to allow the PLO to accept UNSCR 242 with reservations.[95] However, the PLO was disinclined to make formal concessions without guarantees from Washington. To Arafat's dismay, the Carter Administration would not promise that the PLO could participate in a reconvened Geneva Conference. Nor was the White House willing to make an official commitment to establish a Palestinian state or entity.[96]

Arafat and key members of Fatah's leadership continued to signal their willingness to compromise. Messages came directly and indirectly to Washington through the Salameh channel, the American Embassy in Lebanon, and by friendly Arab states. The 1977 PNC meeting in Cairo reaffirmed the PLO's compromise ten-point programme. However, the Carter Administration insisted that it would only establish "official contacts" with the PLO in return for accepting UNSCR 242. In August, Carter's secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, instructed the American Embassy in Lebanon to inform the PLO that it risked "seriously overplaying its hand and may end up with nothing and find itself on the outside looking in while the negotiations process goes forward."[97]

The Likud Party's surprise victory in the May 1977 Israeli Knesset elections created additional obstacles for the Carter Administration: the new prime minister, Menachem Begin, refused to engage in any negotiations that involved the PLO.[98] Begin's intransigence accompanied Assad's interference. Assad argued that the PLO should not settle for merely establishing diplomatic relations with Washington. He also continued to meddle in internal PLO politics to ensure that Arafat could not obtain the necessary support for accepting UNSCR 242 without fracturing the organisation or a fresh round of fighting against Syrian forces in Lebanon.[99] Meanwhile, Carter faced a domestic backlash. Neo-conservative Democrats and pro-Israel groups criticised the Administration's attempts to develop relations with the PLO and reconvene the Geneva conference with Soviet participation. Ten months into

his presidency, Carter's high profile effort to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict was floundering.[100]

Sadat's decision to conduct bilateral negotiations with Israel and sign a separate peace saved Carter's initiative. After Sadat's November 1977 trip to Israel and speech to the Knesset, Carter focused on the Egyptian–Israeli track rather than a comprehensive solution. He also attempted to craft an autonomy agreement for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that would accompany the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty. The focus on Egypt was in line with Israel's goals. Begin's foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, explained to Carter, "'If you take one wheel off a car, it won't drive.' If Egypt is out of the conflict, there will be no more war."[101]

Arafat and the PLO, however, remained determined not to be ignored or excluded. In early March 1978, a group of Fatah commandos landed on the beach near Haifa. Khalaf later wrote that the operation's goal was to demonstrate that the PLO was central to a permanent peace. The original target was an Israeli military installation. However, the mission encountered problems at sea and quickly went awry. The commandos killed a photographer and a taxi driver before seizing two buses. The standoff with Israeli forces saw nine commandos and over 30 Israelis killed.[102] The raid provided the final pretext for an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Israel established a "security zone" enforced by its proxy, the South Lebanon Army. With the signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty the following year, Begin concentrated on retaining the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, removing the Egyptian threat through negotiations allowed Israel to focus on removing the threat of negotiations with the PLO. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the goal of destroying the PLO and initiated a new phase in the country's civil war.[103]

Arafat continued to seek formalised relations with Washington. After the Camp David Accords, the CIA reported that Arafat "does not trust President Sadat" and that he preferred to "deal directly with the United States." However, the Carter Administration insisted that the PLO must first accept UNSCR 242.[104]

In *Years of Upheaval*, Kissinger downplayed his role in the Lebanese civil war and blamed the PLO for the conflict "As it had in Jordan, the Palestinian movement wrecked the delicate balance of Lebanon's stability," he wrote. "Before the peace process could run its course, Lebanon was torn apart. Over its prostrate body at this writing all factions and forces of the Middle East still chase their eternal dreams and act out their perennial nightmares."[105] Yet this was also true of Kissinger and the policies he implemented. America's failure in Vietnam cast a shadow over the deliberations on Lebanon and the broader peace process. Instead of applying the lessons of Vietnam, Kissinger preferred to impose a solution.[106] His fears of a "radical crescent" resembled previous apocalyptic Cold War scenarios from the "bandwagon theory" to the "domino theory." Rather

than representing a geopolitical reality, Kissinger's assertions reflected America's superpower anxieties.

The Lebanese civil war revealed the limits of Kissinger's diplomatic strategy. Although Kissinger claimed that the goal was to demonstrate Washington's indispensability to the peace process, he achieved it by excluding Moscow, alienating Damascus, and ignoring the PLO. The Sinai disengagement agreements established a foundation for the Camp David Accords, but a settlement only came because of Carter's intensive efforts and Sadat's willingness to make major concessions. In addition, the 1975 MOU hindered future initiatives, and peace between Egypt and Israel did not lead to a broader settlement. Even though Kissinger objected to the PLO, the organisation had international legitimacy. Washington's refusal to recognise or publicly engage it served to delay a settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict with consequences in terms of lives lost and regional instability. That the breakthrough between Israel and the PLO did not occur through the United States demonstrates the unnecessary constraints placed on negotiations by Kissinger and adopted by subsequent administrations. Indeed, the terms of the Oslo Accords signed in 1993 resembled Arafat's 1976 proposal for a limited Israeli withdrawal in return for recognition.[107]

Kissinger's actions in Lebanon also challenge the carefully crafted narrative presented in his memoirs. He actively lobbied for Syria's intervention and misled American ambassadors about Washington's role. Nor is it clear if Brown's mediation efforts were sincere. Instead of a radical crescent, Lebanon emerged fractionalised and factionalised. Syria's occupation of Lebanon continued until 2005 and a permanent peace with Israel remains elusive. The PLO survived Syria's invasion and continued its diplomatic initiatives.

The Lebanese civil war also demonstrated the constraints on the PLO. Although successful in obtaining recognition by the UN and Arab League, the PLO was unable to establish relations with Washington. In addition, the organisation's military operations and acts of terrorism undermined its diplomatic efforts. Meanwhile, the PLO's involvement in Lebanese politics unified a coalition to contain, if not eradicate it as an independent military and political force. In spite of the PLO's diplomatic achievements, it remained a weak non-state actor constrained by regional and international Powers as well as its own internal dynamics. These factors coupled with myopic decision-making often forced the PLO's leadership to choose from a range of unpalatable options.[108] In December 1988, the PLO accepted UNSCR 242, recognised Israel's right to exist, and established diplomatic relations with Washington. Yet, its options remained limited.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1. See Paul Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (NY, 2012); Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (Berkeley, CA, 1999); Rashid Khalidi, *Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. has Undermined Peace in the Middle East* (Boston, MA, 2014); Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002); William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict since 1967*, Third Edition (Berkeley, CA, Washington, DC, 2005).

2. David M. Wight, "Kissinger's Levantine Dilemma: The Ford Administration and the Syrian Occupation of Lebanon," *Diplomatic History*, 37/1 (2013), 144–77 is an impressive examination of Kissinger's decision-making based on an initial set of declassified documents. However, Wight understates Kissinger's efforts to undercut the PLO. In addition, Chamberlin's excellent study concludes before the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. Relying on an additional body of declassified records from the Ford and Carter administrations, I contend that PLO attempts to obtain recognition internationally, and from Washington, contributed to Kissinger's actions during Lebanon's civil war and influenced subsequent administrations. Although discussing some aspects of the PLO's diplomatic initiatives prior to and during the Lebanese civil war, Osamah Khalil, "Oslo's Roots: Kissinger, the PLO, and the Peace Process" September 2013, Al-Shabaka.org: https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/oslos-roots-kissinger-plo-and-peace-process does not focus on Washington's role. A number of studies on the Lebanese civil war do not examine the PLO–American relationship during the Lebanese civil war. Cf. Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder, CO, 1990); Helena Cobban: *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics* (Cambridge, 1984); idem., *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (Boulder, CO, 1985); David Hirst, *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (NY, 2011); Mustafa Kabha, *The Palestinian People: Seeking Sovereignty and State* (Boulder, CO, 2014); Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (NY, 1997); Naomi Joy Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975–1976 Civil War* (NY, 1986). There are, however` notable exceptions: Fawaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* Second Edition (NY, 2012) draws on declassified telegrams to discuss Washington's role in encouraging Syria's intervention; R. Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (Boston, MA, 2010) also briefly examines Kissinger's support for Syria's invasion. Although several scholars have examined Kissinger's role in the Nixon and Ford administrations, the Lebanese civil war sees only discussion in passing if at all. See Jussi Hahnhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (NY, 2004); Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (NY, 2015); Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, 2007).

3. Quandt, *Peace Process*, 23–54; Tom Segev, *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East* (NY, 2005). See also Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (NY, 2003); Jessie Ferris, *Nasser's*

Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton, NJ, 2013).

4. Although often used inter-changeably with "guerrillas," the literal translation of *fedayeen* is "those who sacrifice themselves." State Department officials generally referred to the different Palestinian groups as "*fedayeen*."

5. Fatah is a reverse acronym in Arabic for the "Palestinian National Liberation Movement" or *Harakat al-Taḥrīr al-Waṭanī al-Filasṭinī*.

6. For the creation of and competition between Fatah and the PFLP, see Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 75–92, 100–11, 155–242. Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 235 aptly describes the PLO's strategy as "talking while fighting."

7. On Washington's view of the PLO, see Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 136–41; Little, *American Orientalism*, 279–84; Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine*, 140–42; Osamah Khalil, "Pax Americana: The United States, the Palestinians, and the Peace Process, 1948–2008," *New Centennial Review*, 8/1 (2008): 1–41. Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA, 1982), 624–25 gives Kissinger's view. Washington's perceptions of "moderate" and "radical" states and movements found basis in American interests: "moderate" countries and movements aligned with the United States during and after the Cold War; in contrast, "radical" state and non-state actors opposed America's foreign policy.

8. On the "special relationship," see David Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel* (NY, 1993); Michelle Mart, *Eye on Israel: How America came to View the Jewish State as an Ally* (Albany, NY, 2006); Little, *American Orientalism*, 77–116; idem., "The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–1968," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25/4 (1993), 563–85; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: A 'Special Relationship'?" *Diplomatic History*, 22/2 (1998), 231–62.

9. Quandt, *Peace Process*, 63–68 notes that the Rogers Plan was similar to the approach used to achieve the 1949 armistice agreements. Cf. Salim Yaqub, "The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab–Israeli Conflict," in Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds., *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977* (NY, 2008), 231–34. On the PLO's position toward UNSCR 242 and the Rogers Plan, see "Qarrarat al-Majlis al-Waṭanī al-Filasṭinī fī al-Dura al-Istithna'iya 27 August 1970," in R. Hamid, *Muqarrarat al-Majlis al-Waṭanī al-Filasṭinī, 1964–1974* (Beirut, 1975), 169–81.

10. On the Rogers Plan, see Quandt, 73–74; Yaqub, "Weight of Conquest," 231–34. On the Nixon Doctrine's development, see Sargent, *Superpower Transformed*, 42–43, 53–58. On military aid to Israel under the Doctrine, see Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 138–39.

11. For Washington's response to the Jordanian civil war, see Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 108–41; Quandt, *Peace Process*, 78–85. For King Hussein's perspective, see Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven, CT, 2008), 143–57; for the PLO view, see Abu Iyad, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle* (NY, 1981), 78–91.

12. For a detailed examination of the Ames-Salameh relationship, see Kai Bird, *The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames* (NY, 2014).

13. For the full text of the communiqué, see "Joint U.S.–U.S.S.R. Communique, San Clemente," *Washington Post* (24 June 1973): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv /inatl/longterm/summit/archive/com1973-1.htm. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 625 briefly discusses the communiqué. According to Quandt, *Peace Process*, 100–02, the joint communiqué "gave little idea of the content" of the talks between Nixon and Brezhnev and the United States did not support the language on Palestinian rights.

14. Bird, *Good Spy*, 145–47.

15. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 281; Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 142–52; Bird, *Good Spy*, 138–40. Bird questions Salameh's involvement in the BSO, including the Munich attack.

16. In Khalaf's view, the Khartoum operation initially looked to secure the release of the BSO's Oudeh, arrested by the Jordanian authorities in mid-February and tortured whilst in custody. The BSO also targeted Moore because they believed he had served previously in Amman during the Jordanian civil war and "bore a heavy responsibility for its preparation"; see Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, 99–103. David Korn, *Assassination in Khartoum* (Bloomington, IN, 1993) states that Moore did not serve in Jordan.

17. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 311; Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 187–189. Sayigh writes that Khalaf "was probably in direct command" of the Khartoum operation. However, Bird, *Good Spy*, 139 notes that within two weeks of the attack, the State Department claimed Arafat was responsible. A 12 May 1973 meeting of Kissinger, Israeli ambassador to the United States, Simcha Dinitz, and Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban, reiterated this view; see "Memorandum of Conversation," 12 May 1973, *The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969–1977*, Digital National Security Archive [hereafter *DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts*]. A June 1973 intelligence assessment from the American Embassy at Khartoum stated that the operation "was planned and carried out with the full knowledge and personal approval of Yasir Arafat," including orders to execute the diplomats. Intelligence Memorandum, "The Seizure of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum," June 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter FRUS], *1969–1976*, Volume E-6, *Documents on Africa, 1973–1976*: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1969-76ve06.

18. "Contacts with the Fatah Leadership," 18 July 1973, CIA Richard Helms Collection: http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/memo-contacts-fatah-leadership-18-july-1973. Bird, *Good Spy*, 147. A copy of this undated memorandum is also in the Henry A. Kissinger National Security Council Office Files, RMPNL [Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA] and discussed in Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 626.

19. "Contacts with the Fatah Leadership," 2.

20. Comprised of representatives from the different political factions, the Executive Committee is the PLO's highest decision-making body. For a discussion of PLO institutional bodies, see Jamil Hilal, "PLO Institutions: The Challenge Ahead," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23/1 (1993), 46–60.

21. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 237, 309–11; Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 96–98.

22. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 625–27; Bird, *Good Spy*, 148–49. Ames submitted the original memorandum to his mentor Richard Helms, ambassador to Iran and former director of Central Intelligence, who discussed it with Kissinger.

23. See Quandt, *Peace Process*, 103–29; Craig Daigle, *The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973* (New Haven, CT, 2010); Yigal Kipnis, *1973: The Road to War* (Charlottesville, VA, 2013); Richard Parker, ed., *The October War: A Retrospective* (Gainesville, FL, 2001).

24. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (NY, 1999), 471.

25. Daigle, *Limits of Détente*, 315–29; Quandt, *Peace Process*, 115, 125–26.

26. Although Kissinger did not identify which PLO officials met with Walters, Bird reports that it was the al-Hassan brothers. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 624–29; Bird, *Good Spy*, 150–51.

27. For detailed discussion of Kissinger's efforts, see Quandt, *Peace Process*, 55–173.

28. Houghton to Kissinger, 19 February 1974, AAD [Access Archival Database, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD]. For

discussions within the State Department about relations with the PLO, see Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 232–37; Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 2–4.

29. "Political Program adopted by the Twelfth Session of the Palestine National Council, 8 June 1974," *International Documents on Palestine, 1974* [hereafter *IDP*] (Kuwait City, 1977), 449–50. See also Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 238, Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 342–43; Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 4–5.

30. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 342–45; Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 238–39; Cobban, *Palestinian Liberation Organizatio*n, 62, 149; Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 5.

31. Eilts to Kissinger, 11 June 1974, RMNPL.

32. "Contacts with the Fatah Leadership," 2. According to Mahmoud Abbas, the current president of the Palestinian Authority, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko repeatedly stressed to the PLO leadership that there was no alternative to UNSCR 242, but the organisation needed to accept the resolution at the right time. See Mahmoud Abbas, *Through Secret Channels: The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO Leader Abu Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel* (Reading, 1995), 19–20. For Soviet attempts to influence the PLO, see Yevgeny Primakov, *Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present* (NY, 2009).

33. Ashton, *Hussein*, 183; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1138–41.

34. Eilts to Kissinger, 1 November 1974, AAD. One indication of the animosity between the PLO and Jordan was that Khalaf ordered an assassination team to Morocco with orders to kill King Hussein at the Rabat Summit. However, Moroccan authorities arrested the team before they could carry out their mission. See Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, 144–54; Godley to Kissinger, 12 November 1974, AAD.

35. Keating to Kissinger, 1 November 1974, Ibid.

36. On security co-ordination, see Scali to Kissinger, 6 November 1974, Godley to Kissinger, 11 November 1974, both Ibid. On American objections to treating Arafat like a "chief of state," see Scali to Kissinger, 14 November 1974, Ibid.

37. "The Speech of Yasser Arafat," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 4/2 (Winter 1975), 181–92. On the drafting of Arafat's speech, see Ussama Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.–Arab Relations, 1820–2001* (NY, 2010), 308–11.

38. Ingersoll to Crimmins, 21 November 1974, AAD.

39. Scali to Kissinger, 22 November 1974: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974 STATE257905_b.html.

40. Godley to Kissinger, 3 January 1975, AAD; see also Chamberlin, *Global Offensive*, 239–40; Bird, *Good Spy*, 157; Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 6.

41. For details on the meetings with McGovern and Baker, see Baker to Kissinger, 25 May 1975, AAD; "McGovern Backing Palestinian State," *NY Times* (5 April 1975); Seth Tillman, *The United States and the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington, IN, 1982), 212; Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine*, 142–143; Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 6.

42. Lebanon absorbed roughly 100,000 Palestinian refugees during and after the 1948 Palestine War, accounting for ten percent of the country's population. By 1975, there were roughly 300,000 Palestinians in Lebanon. See Dalal Yassine, "Unwelcome Guests: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon," July 2010, Al-Shabaka.org: https://al-shabaka.org/ briefs/unwelcome-guests-palestinian-refugees-lebanon.

43. Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 187–93. For interviews with Camille Sham'un and his son, Dany, see *This Week*, Thames Television, "The Agony of Lebanon" (22 April 1976): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NWwuEIsiZk.

44. Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, 171, 176–77; Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 187.

45. Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 187–89.

46. "Minutes of National Security Council Meeting," 28 March 1975, *FRUS*, Volume XXVI: *Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976* (Washington, DC, 2012), 580–90. The full text of the MOU is available via the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook2/Pages/112%20Israel-United%20States%20Memorandum%20of%20Understandi.aspx. For tensions between the United States and Israel over Sinai II, see Quandt, *Peace Process*, 163–66; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 422–27, 454–456; Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford* (NY, 1979), 287; Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston, MA, 1979), 261–63.

47. See Hermann F. Eilts Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (12 August 1988), 36–37: http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Eilts,%20Herman.toc.pdf.

48. Quandt, *Peace Process*, 170–71; Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley, CA, 1989), 255–61. In addition to the MOU, Israel received a number of incentives from Washington for signing the Sinai II agreement. The Ford Administration increased aid to an unprecedented $2.5 billion, guaranteed that it would maintain Israel's military superiority, and ensured future oil supplies. In a secret letter, Ford also informed Rabin that Washington would "give great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights." See Ford to Rabin, nd, *FRUS*, XXVI, 839–40.

49. "Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting," 10 October 1975, *FRUS*, XXVI, 935.

50. Ibid. For America's 1958 intervention in Lebanon, see S. Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004).

51. "Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting," 13 October 1975, *FRUS*, XXVI, 964.

52. Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, 178–79; Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 373–77; Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 198–99; Helena Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (Boulder, CO, 1985), 131–32.

53. See "Statement issued by the Saiqa General Command explaining its role in the Lebanese crisis," 25 March 1976, *International Documents on Palestine* [*IDP*], *1976* (Beirut, 1978), 388; "Hadīth khās al-sayid Zuhayr Muhsin, Rayyis al-daʿira al-ʿAskariyya fī Munathama al-Tahrir al-Filastiniya wa amin sir qiyāda munathama talaʿiʿ harb al-tahrir al-shaʿbiyya quwat as-Saʿiqa fī Lubnan, hawla al-masāʾil al-rāhina," 9 November 1976, *Al-Wathaʿiq al-Filastīnīyah al-ʿArabīyah, 1976* (Beirut, 1978), 186.

54. Bennett to Kissinger, 3 and 9 March 1976, AAD.

55. Murphy to Kissinger, 24 February 1976, Lambrakis to Kissinger, 1 March 1976, both Ibid.; Dan Oberdorfer, "Mideast Proposal Offered," *Washington Post* (29 February 1976); "PLO Trial Balloon," Ibid. (2 March 1976); Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 7–8.

56. "Memorandum of Conversation," 15 March 1976, *FRUS*, XXVI, 948; Wight, "Kissinger's Levantine Dilemma," 155. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 1043 selectively quotes from this memorandum but does not mention prior discussions between Syrian officials and Murphy. In conversations with Murphy, Assad may have discussed intervening in Lebanon as early as 16 October 1975; see Primakov, *Russia and the Arabs*, 182.

57. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 1043.

58. "Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting," 24 March 1976, *FRUS*, XXVI, 961.

59. "Memorandum of Conversation," 24 March 1976, *DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts*. Kissinger and Dinitz also held a private meeting for 25 minutes with no notes taken.

60. Kissinger and Dinitz TelCon, 27 March 1976, DNSA, *The Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969–1977* [hereafter *DNSA, Kissinger TelCons*].

61. "Memorandum of Conversation," 26 March 1976, *FRUS*, XXVI, 977.

62. On Israel's changing signals, see Wight, "Kissinger's Levantine Dilemma," 160–61. On arming the Christian militias, see Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 201–02; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 1041–42.

63. Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 203; Seale, *Asad*, 278–280; Murphy to Kissinger, 19 April 1976, AAD.

64. Assad had a "stormy seven-hour meeting" with Jumblatt on 27 March 1976 that served to entrench the LNM's position. Assad also met Arafat three times from March to May in an effort to convince the PLO not to continue fighting. On 12 April, Assad gave a public speech warning the PLO that "a great conspiracy is being hatched against the Arab nation" and that the "prime target" was the Palestinian leadership. See Seale, *Asad*, 280–83.

65. Wight, "Kissinger's Levantine Dilemma," 159–60. According to Primakov, *Russia and the Arabs*, 182, Brown informed Jumblatt, "a common policy has been agreed between Washington and Damascus."

66. Brown informed Kissinger of private remarks by Shafiq al-Hout, a senior PLO official. Explaining that PLO moderates viewed al-Hout as "an 'impartial mediator' with influence on all sides," Brown added, "I pass this along for your information as further indication of the tangled skeins with which we are dealing here. It might be worth a footnote, when the history of the problem is finally recorded, that at one moment I stood on the brink of becoming 'Brown of Palestine'." Brown to Kissinger, 7 April 1976, AAD.

67. "Memorandum of Conversation," 23 April 1976, *DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts*. Harold Saunders drafted the message to Arafat—approved by Kissinger—on 23 April. Kissinger insisted that the message be delivered orally, requesting that the CIA not send it by cable.

68. Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 204; Cobban, *Modern Lebanon*, 137–38. Raymond Edde, the opposition candidate, and a bloc of supporters in the Lebanese Parliament boycotted the election due to Syrian interference. The political situation became complicated further by Lebanon's president, Sulayman Franjiyeh, refusing to end his term early. As a result, Sarkis did not take office until September.

69. For a sympathetic portrayal of Assad's decision to intervene, see Seale, *Asad*, 283.

70. Kissinger quoted in Wight, "Kissinger's Levantine Dilemma," 169–70 n54. As Wight notes, there is a gap in the archival record from May to June; it would illuminate American decision-making on the Syrian intervention. The published *FRUS* volume for the Lebanese civil war does not contain any documents from 27 April to 15 June 1976.

71. Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 204–10; Cobban, *Modern Lebanon*, 138–40.

72. Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, 188–89; Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 9. In addition to Meloy, also killed were Robert Waring, the Embassy's Economic Advisor, and Zuheir Moghrabi, the ambassador's driver.

73. "Minutes of National Security Council Meeting," 7 April 1976, *FRUS*, 1017; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 1042; Kissinger and Schweid, 26 July 1976, *DNSA, Kissinger Telcons*.

74. Bird, *Good Spy*, 175–76; Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 9–10. For Ford's statement, see "Question and Answer Session with the President," 20 June 1976, Gerald R. Ford Administration White House Press Releases [Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Grand Rapids, Michigan, US] 31 May 1976–22 June 1976. For Kissinger's letter and

the PLO's statement, see James M. Markham, "Peace Force in Beirut," *NY Times* (22 June 1976).

75. "Memorandum of Conversation," 18 June 1976, *FRUS*, XXVI, 1034–36.
76. Memorandum of Conversation," 22 June 1976, Ibid., 1036–37.
77. Kissinger suggested that Israel and Syria were in contact through the Lebanese Christian parties or through Jordan. Pickering added, "We heard one report they were in touch somewhere in Europe." Ibid., 1039–40.
78. Ibid., 1040.
79. Ibid., 1042.
80. Ibid., 1042–44.
81. Ibid., 1046.
82. "Memorandum of Conversation," 20 July 1976, *DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts*. See Primakov, *Russia and the Arabs*, 181–82 for tensions between Moscow and Damascus,
83. "Memorandum of Conversation," 7 August 1976, 1056.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 1056–57. Later in the meeting, Kissinger contradicted himself, "We don't want the PLO under Syrian control. That is why I resisted Syrian plans for a quick takeover in March." Ibid., 1061.
86. Ibid., 1058.
87. Ibid., 1058–59; Khalil, "Oslo's Roots," 10–11.
88. *FRUS*, XXVI, 1061.
89. Ibid., 1062.
90. Traboulsi, *Modern Lebanon*, 207; Cobban, *Modern Lebanon*, 141–42. Cobban reports that 2,200 Palestinians from Tal al-Za'atar were killed, 1,500 of whom after the camp surrendered. According to survivors, summary executions of adult and teenage males occurred, and there were numerous reports of rape.
91. Murphy to Atherton, 11 July 1976, AAD; "Memorandum of Conversation," 17 August 1976, *DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts*.
92. Cobban, *Modern Lebanon*, 143–44; "Resolution of the six-nation Arab summit conference held to consider the war in Lebanon," 18 October 1976, *IDP, 1976*, 492–93.
93. "Memorandum of Conversation," 13 December 1976, *DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts*.
94. Ibid.
95. Eilts explained that the Carter Administration and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance viewed the MOU in "much more strict constructionist terms" and read it "in more legalistic terms and binding." Thus, the Carter Administration expected the PLO to make a statement consistent with the MOU. See Eilts Oral History, 37. For an examination of the Carter Administration's approach to the PLO that focuses on human rights, see Victor V. Nemchenok, "These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government": United States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977–1979, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 20/4 (2009), 595–618. For the influence of the Brookings Institution's 1975 Study Group on the Carter Administration's approach, see Jørgen Jensehaugen, "Blueprint for Arab–Israeli Peace? President Carter and the Brookings Report," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 25/3 (2014), 492–508.
96. Parker to Atherton, 19 August 1977, CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 20 August 1977, Parker to Atherton, both *FRUS*, Volume VIII: *Arab Israeli Dispute, 1977–1980* (Washington, DC, 2013), 481–89.
97. Brzezinski to Carter, nd, Vance to Parker, August 17, 1977, both Ibid., 335–36, 477–78; Murphy to Vance, 22 February 1977, Matthews to Vance, 1 April 1977, both AAD.

98. "Memorandum of Conversation," 18 July 1977, "Memorandum of Conversation," 19 July 1977, "Memorandum of Conversation," 9 August 1977, "Memorandum of Conversation," 10 August 1977, all *FRUS*, VIII, 336–58, 426–50.

99. Quandt to Brzezinski, 19 September 1977, Brzezinski to Carter, 19 September 1977, both Ibid., 498–520. According to Eilts, the PLO's Executive Committee voted 11–4 against accepting UNSCR 242 with reservations due to Syrian pressure; see Eilts Oral History, 39.

100. Jordan to Carter, June 1977, NSC Annual Report, nd, both *FRUS*, VIII, 279–94, 801–03. See also Quandt, *Peace Process*, 188–89.

101. "Memorandum of Conversation," 4 October 1977, *FRUS*, VIII, 671. The meeting with Dayan followed tensions between the United States and Israel as the Carter Administration attempted to salvage its initiative. A month earlier, Israeli forces attacked PLO positions in southern Lebanon. Begin claimed the incursion was in support of Israel's Lebanese Christian allies. After Carter objected to the attack in a sharply worded letter, Israeli forces withdrew. See "Memorandum of Conversation," 10 August 1977, Carter to Begin, 24 September 1977, Viets to Brzezinski, 24 September 1977, all Ibid., 435–40, 564–70.

102. Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, 214–16; Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 425; "Captured Arab Describes Bus Raid," *NY Times* (20 March 1978); Vance to Viets, 11 and 16 March 1978, both *FRUS*, VIII, 1056–58.

103. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 426–27; Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (NY, 2001), 384–424.

104. "CIA Report," nd, *FRUS*, Volume IX: *Arab Israeli Dispute, Aug. 1978–Dec. 1980* (Washington, DC, 2014), 296–97.

105. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 789. Kissinger *Years of Renewal*, 1022 reiterated this quote a decade after the Lebanese civil war ended and whilst Israelis and Palestinians were engaged in active negotiations as part of the Oslo Peace Process.

106. See Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (Berkeley, CA, 2001).

107. See Khalil, "Oslo's Roots."

108. For more on this dynamic, see Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Boston, MA, 2006).

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